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Abstract 
Employing the price-quality competition model in a horizontally differentiated products 
market, we analyze how a demand spillover effect associated with upgrading the quality level 
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degree of a demand spillover effect. Then, we consider the cases of second-best policy and 
cooperative quality choice. Furthermore, we illustrate that there exists a natural Stackelberg 
equilibrium under asymmetric demand spillover effects that is Pareto superior to other 
equilibria. Finally, we examine an optimal policy with international R&D rivalry.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Introducing a demand spillover effect into a model of quality choice competition, we 
analyze the strategic relationship between firms and the property of a subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium (SPNE, hereafter) in a two-stage game in which firms compete in price and 
quality in a horizontally differentiated products market.  
With respect to a demand spillover effect introduced in this paper, for example, we 
suppose that the development of an eco-vehicle equipped with an electric motor or a hybrid 
engine would enhance the willingness to pay of some customers who are sensitive to 
environmental issues but do not consider the car design, i.e., the brand name to be very 
important. This, in turn, implies that some of them (or new customers) may purchase an 
eco-vehicle regardless of the brand name of automobile makers. In other words, the 
development of a new product and/or the quality upgrade of a product may expand the market 
size of the industry. In this case, the effect of one firm’s quality-improving investment on the 
rival firm’s market share may not be necessarily negative. 
Our model is characterized by the following two aspects: (i) R&D investment competition, 
in particular, quality choice; and (ii) a demand spillover effect. Related to the first aspect, 
there is an extensive body of literature in which researchers analyze the market competition 
and process and/or product R&D investments: firms invest to reduce the marginal cost of 
production, to develop a new product, or to upgrade the quality level of a product in the first 
stage, and then compete in price or quantity in the second stage. Consequently, they show 
how the R&D investments affect the environment of market competition. In addition, they 
consider a strategic R&D policy. As seminal papers, we take Brander and Spencer (1983), 
Spencer and Brander (1983), and others. Assuming duopolistic and oligopolistic markets for a 
homogenous product, they deal with Cournot quantity competition and a process (i.e., 
cost-reducing) R&D investment, and examine a strategic R&D investment subsidy/tax policy 
with international rivalry. It will be shown later that an optimal R&D investment policy 
depends on the strength of a demand spillover effect.  
Furthermore, based on a vertical differentiation model, some researchers consider the 
nature of the equilibrium in product R&D (i.e., quality-improving) investment competition, 
and show the optimal industrial policies. For example, we have Aoki and Prusa (1996), Park 
(2001), Zhou et al. (2002), Aoki (2003), and others. In particular, they prove that the strategic 
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relationship between the firms (i.e., one firm producing a high-quality product and the other 
producing a low-quality product) and the effect of an increase in the quality level of one firm 
on the rival firm’s profit depend on the mode of market competition (i.e., Bertrand price 
competition and Cournot quantity competition). However, it will be shown later that the 
strategic relationship and the effect on the rival firm’s profit depend on the strength of a 
demand spillover effect. 
With respect to the second aspect, many researchers have already considered a 
technological spillover effect in the context of an R&D investment competition. For example, 
d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) analyze noncooperative and cooperative process R&D 
investments in the presence of a spillover effect on the marginal cost of production. 
Furthermore, Symeonidis (2003) considers a spillover effect of quality improvement on the 
investment cost in the cases of quantity and price competition.  
Related to the analysis of a product R&D investment, Ornaghi (2006) states in his 
empirical analysis that a firm that enhances the quality of its product by learning from 
technological innovations receives a positive externality that can be estimated only by shifting 
attention to the demand side. Furthermore, Levin and Reiss (1988) empirically analyze the 
relationships between cost-reducing (i.e., process) and demand-creating (i.e., product) R&D 
investments with spillover effects. That is, they show that an increase in the extent of process 
(product) spillovers will lead to an increase in product (process) R&D, based on the 
estimation of the model using manufacturing line-of-business data and other data. We focus 
on a spillover effect on the demand side, and do not address the relationship between the 
process and product R&D innovations.  
Furthermore, Foros et al. (2002) is closely related to ours. They analyze roaming policy in 
the market for mobile telecommunications and competing mobile telephony providers’ 
incentives to invest in, and share infrastructure. That is, they focus on the interaction 
between roaming policy and investment incentives in the third generation mobile networks. 
The mechanism deriving their results is that in the presence of roaming agreements, 
investments carried out by one firm increase the value of the services provided by other 
firms. The roaming agreement is proportionate to a demand spillover effect in our model.  
Foros et al. (2002) is an extension of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and others, 
which analyze strategic R&D investment. In their model, infrastructure investments give rise 
to spillover effects, through the roaming agreements, similar to those considered in models 
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of strategic R&D investments. For example, they show that infrastructure investments in the 
noncooperative and cooperative cases depend on the roaming quality level. 
Although the roaming quality level is endogenously given in the model of Foros et al. 
(2002), the parameters describing demand spillover effects are assumed to be exogenously 
given, but asymmetry in our model. Furthermore, we mainly deal with the case of a Bertrand 
price competition1.  
As illustrated below, we focus on a spillover effect that increases the quality level for a 
consumer’s utility, and therefore on the demand side. In particular, we show that there are 
both constructive and combative effects of an increase in the quality level2. That is, an 
increase in the quality level of one firm takes some customers from the other firm, and thus 
increases the firm’s individual demand while the other firm’s demand is reduced. For 
example, using a Hotelling spatial model of duopoly with a quality dimension of product 
differentiation, Ishibashi and Kaneko (2008) show the effect of privatization on welfare in 
the case of a mixed duopoly. In their model, an increase in the quality level of one firm 
reduces the other firm’s profit, so that the strategic substitute relationship between the firms 
holds. In this case, the effect of an increase in the quality level on the rival firm is combative. 
However, as mentioned above, an increase in the quality level of one firm can call new 
customers into the market, and thus expand market size. As a result, the quality improvement 
may increase the other firm’s demand. In this case, we state that the effect of an increase in 
the quality level on the rival firm and on the industry is constructive. 
To sum up, the novelty of this paper, if any, is its examination of the nature of duopolistic 
competition with a quality dimension of product differentiation associated with a demand 
spillover effect. 
The remainder of the paper is composed as follows. Section 2 presents a model, in which 
we assume a quasi-linear utility function including a demand spillover effect associated with 
quality upgrading. Section 3 considers the strategic relationship between firms and the 
property of SPNE in price–quality duopolistic competition. Section 4 addresses issues such as 
the cases of second-best quality choice and cooperative quality choice. In this section, we also 
                                                 
1 In Appendix A, we analyze the case of a Cournot quantity competition. Our results in that 
case are basically similar to Lemma 1, 2, and 3 of Foros, et al. (2002). 
2 The terminology is due to Marshall (1919, pp. 304–307), by which he explains the effects 
of advertisements. We understand that the effect of a quality-upgrading investment on the 
demand side is similar to that of advertisements. 
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examine the existence of a natural Stackelberg equilibrium and an optimal R&D investment 
subsidy/tax policy in the case of international R&D rivalry. Finally, Section 5 summarizes the 
results and presents some remaining issues. 
 
 
2. The model 
 
We assume a duopolistic competition in a horizontally differentiated products market. 
That is, the firms compete in a two-stage game: in stage 1, a firm simultaneously chooses the 
quality level, ,iq  and, in stage 2, a firm simultaneously chooses the price, ,ip .2,1=i  We 
confine our attention to SPNE in the two-stage game by solving the model backwards. 
   As mentioned above, we focus on a spillover effect associated with upgrading quality on 
the demand side. In particular, we assume that an increase in quality level of one product 
increases the willingness to pay of a consumer, and thus expands the market size. This, in turn, 
may increase the rival firm’s demand. To highlight this aspect, we assume that the utility of a 
representative consumer is given by 
[ ] ,,; 0212,1 xqqxxUV +=  and  
( ) ( ) ( ){ },
2
1
22112121
2
2
2
121 xxxxxxxxxxU ωωθα +++Ω+



−+−+= (1) 
where 0x  is a numeral good and .10 =p  Also, 0>α  and .01 >>θ  θ  stands for a 
parameter indicating substitutability between the products.  
In the second parenthesis composed of quality arguments as in eq. (1), we assume that 
[ ]21,qqΩ=Ω  is an increasing function of the qualities preexisting in the industry, i.e., 
,0>
∂
Ω∂
iq
 which is associated with the market size. This illustrates a demand spillover effect. 
Furthermore, [ ] 2,1, == iqiii ωω  is an increasing function of its own quality, i.e., 
,0>
∂
∂
i
i
q
ω
 which is associated with product i’s individual demand. For tractability, we 
assume as follows. 
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Assumption 1: Linearity of a demand spillover effect 
(i) [ ] ,, 221121 qqqq εε +=Ω  where )2,1,0( => iiε  is the marginal coefficient of the 
effect of an increase in the quality level of product i on the market demand3. 
(ii) [ ] ,iiii qq βω =  where )2,1,0( => iiβ  is the marginal coefficient of the effect of 
an increase in the quality level of product i on its own individual demand. 
 
The budget constraint is given by ,02211 xxpxpI ++≥  where I  is a given income 
of a representative consumer. Thus, we obtain the optimal behavior of a representative 
consumer as follows. 
{ } { } .)( ijjiiiji
i
pqqxx
x
U
=+++−−=
∂
∂
εβεθα  
In this case, the marginal utility of product i, in other words, a willingness to pay for it 
depends on the quality level of product j , which is a substitute for product i, as well as the 
quality of its own product. This implies that an increase in the quality level of product j 
increases the marginal utility of product i. This illustrates a demand spillover effect4. 
Therefore, we derive the demand function of product i as follows. 
{ } { }
,
)1)(1(
)1()1()1(
θθ
θθβθεβθεθα
+−
+−−−++−+−
=
jijjjiii
i
ppqq
x    (2) 
where .,2,1, jiji ≠=  For eq. (2), we have 
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 ,,2,1, jiji ≠=          (3) 
where 1<
+
≡Ε
jj
j
j βε
ε
 stands for the degree of a demand spillover effect. Hereafter, we 
omit the indexes of the firms in each equation, i.e., ,,2,1, jiji ≠=  unless we refer to them 
especially.  
                                                 
3 If [ ] ,0, 21 =Ω qq  the utility function is formally similar to that of Häckner (2000). See 
also the appendix in Symeonidis (2003). In this case, the effect of improving the quality level 
is combative only. 
4 With regard to the effect of product R&D investments, Levin and Reiss (1988) present a 
multiplicative marginal utility function. Contrarily, the marginal utility function in our model 
is an additive type. 
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As shown in eq. (3), there are two effects of an increase in the quality level of product j on 
the demand of firm i as follows. The first is a positive effect whereby an increase in the 
quality level of product j increases the total market demand for the products, and this, in turn, 
increases firm i’s individual demand, i.e., a constructive effect. On the contrary, the second is 
a negative effect whereby an increase in the quality level of product j increases its own 
demand, and this, in turn, decreases firm i’s individual demand because of substitutability 
between the products, i.e., a combative effect. Thus, if the constructive effect is larger 
(smaller) than the combative effect, then an increase in the quality level of product j increases 
(reduces) the demand of firm i. 
 
 
3. Quality competition in the presence of a demand spillover effect 
 
3.1 Quality competition 
In stage 2, firm i decides the price to maximize profit, ].[ iiiii qFxp −=Π  Hence, we 
assume that the investment cost to improve the quality level is given by ],[ ii qF  where 
,0]0[]0[ =′= ii FF  ,0][ >
′
ii qF ,0][ >
″
ii qF  for ,0>iq  ,][lim ∞=
′
∞→ iiz qFi  and 
,0][''' ≥ii qF  .2,1=i  Furthermore, to simplify the analysis, we assume the marginal cost of 
production is zero. 
The first-order condition (FOC, hereafter) for maximizing the profit of firm i is given by 
,0=Λ−=
∂
Π∂
ii
i
i px
p
 where .0
)1)(1(
1
>
+−
≡Λ
θθ
 Taking eq. (3) into account, we 
obtain 
{ } { } .02)1()1()1( =+−−−++−+− jijjjiii ppqq θθβθεβθεθα    (4) 
Therefore, the price of product i is given by 
,
Δ
Γ+Φ+Α
=
jjii
i
qq
p  ,0)2)(2( >+−≡Δ θθ                      (5) 
where 0)2)(1( >+−≡Α θθα  and .0)2()2)(1( 2 >−++−≡Φ θβθθε iii  
Furthermore, we have .)2)(1( θβθθε jjj −+−≡Γ  In this case, for eq. (5), it holds that 
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[ ] ,)(0)(0)( θ<≥ΕΘ⇔<≥Γ⇔<≥
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j
i
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p
                         (6) 
where [ ] 1
2
8 12
<
Ε−+Ε
≡ΕΘ
−−
jj
j  and [ ] ,0>ΕΘ′ j  .2,1=j  
Eq. (6) shows that if the parameter composed of the degree of a demand spillover effect of 
product j, i.e., [ ]jΕΘ , is larger (smaller) than a certain value of substitutability, ,θ  then an 
increase in the quality level of product j raises (reduces) the price of product i. That is, firm i 
has to raise (cut) the price, because the constructive effect on product i’s demand through an 
increase in the total market demand is larger (smaller) than the combative effect on it through 
a substitutability between the products. 
In stage 1, firm i decides the quality level to maximize profit, which is given by 
[ ] [ ],, iijiii qFqqR −=Π  where [ ] ., 2ijii pqqR Λ=  The FOC is given by 
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∂
∂
−
Δ
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Also, the second-order condition (SOC, hereafter) is given by 
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Furthermore, the cross effect is given by 
.0)(  0)(2
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             (9) 
With respect to the effect on the profit (i.e., revenue) of the rival firm, we obtain 
.0)(0)(2 <≥Γ⇔<≥
Δ
Γ
Λ=
∂
∂
=
∂
Π∂
j
j
i
j
i
j
i p
q
R
q
                       (10) 
   For the following analysis, we assume as follows. 
 
Assumption 2: Asymmetric demand spillover effects 
The degree of a demand spillover effect of product 1 is larger than that of product 2, i.e., 
.21 Ε>Ε  In this case, it holds that [ ] [ ].2211 ΕΘ≡Θ>ΕΘ≡Θ  
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Taking into account eq. (9), eq. (10), and Assumption 2, we derive the following lemma. 
 
Lemma 1 
(i) If ,21 θ>Θ>Θ  each firm’s reaction curve is sloping upward. Hence an increase in 
the quality of product 2 (1) increases the revenue of firm 1 (2). 
(ii) If ,21 Θ>Θ>θ  each firm’s reaction curve is sloping downward. Hence an 
increase in the quality of product 2 (1) decreases the revenue of firm 1 (2). 
(iii) If ,21 Θ>>Θ θ  firm 1’s reaction curve is sloping downward, whereas firm 2’s is 
sloping upward. Hence an increase in the quality of product 2 (1) decreases 
(increases) the revenue of firm 1 (2). 
 
As analyzed in d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and others, the strategic relationship 
between firms in the case of cost-reducing R&D investment competition is one of substitutes. 
Furthermore, in the case of quality competition, e.g., Aoki and Prusa (1996), Park (2001), 
Zhou et al. (2002), Aoki (2003), and others, the strategic relationship between firms depends 
on the mode of market competition. However, in our model, the strategic relationship depends 
on the degree of a demand spillover effect. Accordingly, Lemma 1 holds in the case of a 
Cournot duopoly (see Appendix A). 
For Lemma 1 (i) (Lemma 1 (ii)), if the degree of demand spillover effects of both firms’ 
products is larger (smaller) than a certain value of substitutability, an increase in the quality 
level of one firm expands (reduces) the rival firm’s demand, and this, in turn, increases 
(decreases) the rival firm’s price and quality. As a result, the rival firm’s profit increases 
(decreases). Similarly, an increase in the rival firm’s quality increases (decreases) the firm’s 
profits. In this case, the strategic complement (substitute) relationship between the firms is 
confirmed. See Figure 1 (Figure 2), in which we illustrate Pareto superior sets as the area 
surrounded by the iso-profit curves of both firms, i.e., a real line of .2,1, =Π iNi  
 
Place Figure 1 and Figure 2 approximately here 
 
For Lemma 1 (iii), if the degree of a demand spillover effect is asymmetric between the 
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firms, i.e., the degree of a demand spillover effect of product 1 is larger and that of product 2 
is smaller than a certain value of substitutability, an increase in product 1 expands firm 2’s 
demand, while an increase in product 2 reduces firm 1’s demand. In this case, firm 2 increases 
its price and quality, while firm 1 decreases them. As a result, firm 2’s profit increases, while 
firm 1’s falls. Thus, a strategic substitute relationship holds for firm 1, while a strategic 
complement relationship holds for firm 2. See Figure 3, in which, similarly, we illustrate 
Pareto superior sets as the area surrounded by the iso-profit curves (drawing a real line) of 
both firms. 
 
Place Figure 3 approximately here 
 
3.2 The existence and the property of SPNE  
Based on eq. (5) and eq. (7), for example, assuming a simple quadratic cost function of 
quality, i.e., ,0,2,1,
2
][ 2 >== fiqfqF iii  we prove that there exists an SPNE in a 
price–quality competition (see Appendix B). Here, in view of Lemma 1, we consider the 
properties of the SPNE and the implications of demand spillover effects. 
   Let us deal with the case in which the degree of demand spillover effects of both products 
is large, i.e., .21 θ>Θ>Θ  As mentioned above, both reaction curves are upward sloping 
and exist in the Pareto superior sets (see Figure 1). Formally, the nature of an SPNE in quality 
competition is the same as that of Bertrand–Nash equilibrium. In this case, neither firm will 
take an initiative to improve their quality level. This is because an increase in the quality level 
helps the rival firm to increase its profit according to a constructive effect. Thus, as will be 
analyzed later, this implies that each firm will be a follower (or a free rider). 
   By contrast, when the degree of demand spillover effects of both products is small, i.e., 
,21 Θ>Θ>θ  both reaction curves are downward sloping and do not exist in the Pareto 
superior sets (see Figure 2). Formally, the nature of an SPNE in quality competition is the 
same as that of Cournot–Nash equilibrium. In this case, each firm has an incentive to increase 
its quality level to take market share from the rival firm due to a combative effect. Thus, this 
implies that both firms will be a leader. 
   We now consider the case of asymmetric demand spillover effects, i.e., .21 Θ>>Θ θ  
As illustrated in Figure 3, the reaction curve of firm 1 is downward sloping, while that of firm 
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2 is upward sloping. Hence, the reaction curve of firm 1 exists in the Pareto superior sets. 
Firm 1 has an incentive to increase its quality level to take market share from firm 2, just as in 
a Cournot quantity competition. On the other hand, because firm 2 knows that the degree of a 
demand spillover effect from firm 1 is large, firm 2 chooses to reduce the quality level, and 
this, in turn, makes firm 1 increase the quality level. As a result, the market size expands, and 
thus the profits of both firms increase. This suggests the possibility of a cooperative quality 
choice between the firms, i.e., semi-collusion. 
 
 
4. Discussion and application 
 
4.1 Second-best qualities 
We assume that a public authority, i.e., a government, can decide the quality levels of the 
products to maximize social welfare in the first stage, although the firms noncooperatively 
decide prices in the second stage.  
The social welfare function is expressed as 
[ ] [ ] [ ],,,, 212121 qqPSqqCSqqWW +=≡                            (11) 
where [ ] [ ] ( ) 2122212211212,121 21,;, xxxxxpxpqqxxUqqCS θ++=−−≡  is 
consumer surplus and [ ] [ ] [ ]21221121 ,,, qqqqqqPS Π+Π≡  is producer surplus, in other 
words, joint profits.  
Given eq. (11), the FOC to maximize social welfare with respect to the qualities is given 
by .0=
∂
Π∂
+
∂
Π∂
+
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
i
j
i
i
ii qqq
CS
q
W
 When evaluating the FOC at ,0=
∂
Π∂
i
i
q
 it holds that 
.2,1,0
0
=>
∂
∂
=
∂
Π∂
i
q
W
i
i
q
i
 See Appendix C. Thus, we derive the following result. 
 
Result 1 
Regardless of the degree of a demand spillover effect, the firms provide the products 
associated with lower qualities rather than those of the second-best case. 
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4.2 Cooperative investment equilibrium: joint profit maximization 
We consider the cooperative case in which the firms decide the quality level to maximize 
the joint profits (i.e., producer surplus), although they noncooperatively compete in price in 
the market.  
Let us define the joint profits as follows: [ ] [ ] [ ].,,, 21221121 qqqqqqPS Π+Π≡  Thus, 
the FOC to maximize the joint profits with respect to the quality level of firm 1’s product is 
given by .0
1
2
1
1
1
=
∂
Π∂
+
∂
Π∂
=
∂
∂
qqq
PS
 In this case, when evaluating the FOC at ,0
1
1
=
∂
Π∂
q
 
in view of eq. (10), it holds that ( ).1
1
2
01
1
1
Γ=
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
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Furthermore, from the FOC of firm 2, we obtain the same outcome, i.e., 
( ).2
02
2
2
Γ=








∂
∂
=
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sign
q
PSsign
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Accordingly, based on Lemma 1, we derive the following result. 
 
Result 2 
(i) If ,21 θ>Θ>Θ  the cooperative quality level of both firms’ products is higher than 
the noncooperative one. 
(ii) If ,21 Θ>Θ>θ  the cooperative quality level of both firms’ products is lower than 
the noncooperative one. 
(iii) If ,21 Θ>>Θ θ  firm 1’s product quality level is higher and firm 2’s product quality 
level is lower than the noncooperative one, respectively. 
 
When the degree of a demand spillover effect is large, upgrading the quality level of one 
firm expands market size, and thus increases the other firm’s profit as well as that firm’s profit. 
Thus, in the case of the cooperative quality decision, both firms have incentives to improve 
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the quality level compared with the noncooperative case. Furthermore, because an increase in 
the quality level enhances consumer surplus, the cooperative quality decision is preferable 
from a social welfare point of view.  
On the other hand, when the degree of a demand spillover effect is small, upgrading the 
quality level of one firm takes consumers from the other firm, and thus, reduces the other 
firm’s profit. Thus, in the cooperative case, both firms decrease quality levels compared with 
the noncooperative case. Thus, because a decrease in the quality level reduces consumer 
surplus, the cooperative quality decision is not preferable from a social welfare point of view. 
Under asymmetric demand spillover effects, in the case of the cooperative quality decision, 
firm 1 (2) providing the product with a high (low) demand spillover effect increases 
(decreases) the quality level, because an increase in the quality level of firm 1’s (2’s) product 
increases joint profits. In other words, an increase in the quality level of the product with a 
high demand spillover effect promotes a constructive effect, whereas a decrease in the quality 
level of the product with a low demand spillover effect reduces a combative effect. From a 
social welfare point of view, whether the cooperative quality decision under an asymmetric 
spillover effect is preferable or not is unidirectional. 
 
4.3 A natural Stackelberg equilibrium 
Related to the analysis in Sections 3.2 and 4.2, here, applying the extended endogenous 
timing game of an observable delay framework in Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) and following 
the definition of Albaek (1990), we analyze the existence of a natural Stackelberg equilibrium. 
That is, the players determine the timing of the action as well as the action itself. If the players 
choose the actions at different times, then the player choosing a later time observes the action 
chosen by the initiating player, giving rise to a sequential play subgame, and thus Stackelberg 
equilibrium holds in the game. If the players instead choose actions at the same time, then a 
simultaneous play subgame occurs, and thus Nash equilibrium holds in the game.  
Consequently, by using the extended endogenous timing game of observable delay, we 
provide comparisons between the payoffs in the simultaneous play game and the two 
sequential play games. In this case, if one firm prefers being a leader to being a follower and 
prefers not to play a simultaneous Nash game, while the other firm prefers being a follower to 
being a leader and  also prefers not to play a simultaneous Nash game, then a natural 
Stackelberg equilibrium is attained.  
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   Although we omit the complicated calculations, taking Lemma 1 into account, we can 
easily derive the following relationships between the profits (see Figures 1, 2 , and 3).  
 
Lemma 2 
(i) If ,21 θ>Θ>Θ  it holds that 
N
i
L
i Π>Π  and ,
N
i
F
i Π>Π  .2,1=i  
(ii) If ,21 Θ>Θ>θ  it holds that ,FiNiLi Π>Π>Π  .2,1=i  
(iii) If ,21 Θ>>Θ θ  it holds that NL 11 Π>Π  and ,11 NF Π>Π  and that 
.222
FNL Π>Π>Π  
 
   Under Lemma 2 (i), just as in a Bertrand price competition, both firms prefer to being 
either a leader or a follower to playing a simultaneous Nash game. However, each firm prefers 
being a follower to being a leader, because it holds that ,Li
F
i Π>Π  .2,1=i  Furthermore, 
two Stackelberg equilibria in which either firm is a leader exist in the Pareto superior sets (see 
1S  and 2S  in Figure 1). Similarly, under Lemma 2 (ii), just as in a Cournot quantity 
competition, both firms prefer to being a leader to being a follower and playing a 
simultaneous Nash game. See Theorem V (A) in Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). Furthermore, 
two Stackelberg equilibria in which either firm is a leader do not exist in the Pareto superior 
sets (see 1S  and 2S  in Figure 2). 
   Under Lemma 2 (iii), firm 1 prefers being either a leader or a follower to playing a 
simultaneous Nash game. On the other hand, firm 2 prefers being a leader to being a follower 
and playing a simultaneous Nash game. In this case, because firm 1 expects that firm 2 will be 
a leader, firm 1 is to be a follower. Therefore, based on Hamilton and Slutsky (1990, Theorem 
V (B)) and Albaek (1990, Definition), we derive as follows. 
 
Result 3 
There exists a natural Stackelberg situation under asymmetric demand spillover effects in 
which firm 2 providing the product that has a low demand spillover effect is a leader and firm 
1 providing the product that has a high demand spillover effect is a follower.  
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In addition, we show that the natural Stackelberg equilibrium exists in the Pareto superior 
sets. Furthermore, compared with the Nash equilibrium, in the natural Stackelberg equilibrium, 
firm 2 providing the product that has a low demand spillover effect reduces the quality level, 
whereas firm 1 providing the product that has a high demand spillover effect increases the 
quality level5. See point 2S  in Figure 3. 
A minor firm that does not have a brand value and provides a product with only a small 
effect on market demand decides in advance to choose the lower quality level. This makes the 
major firm that has a big brand name and provides the product with a large effect on market 
demand increase its quality level. Thus, the market expands, and both firms can raise their 
prices. As a result, both firms would make more profits than otherwise. 
 
4.4 Optimal quality-upgrading R&D investment policy with international rivalry 
We analyze an optimal policy, using a standard framework of a third-country market 
presented by Spencer and Brander (1983). That is, there are two countries, home and foreign, 
in each of which a firm exits. Each firm sells the product to the third-country market, but does 
not sell it to markets in the home and foreign countries. Hereafter, the firm located in the 
home (foreign) country is firm 1 (2). 
   We assume that the home and foreign governments commit to a quality-upgrading R&D 
investment subsidy/tax policy in stage 0, prior to the two-stage game played by the firms. 
In this case, the profit function of firm i in stage 1 is revised as follows. 
[ ] [ ] ,,2,1,],[)1(,, jijiqFsqqRqq iiijiijii ≠=−−=Π  
where )1(<is  is an investment subsidy from the government of country i. A negative is  
implies an investment tax. Thus, taking the FOC into account, we derive the effects of a 
subsidy on the quality level of the firms as follows. 
02
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>
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ji
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where .,2,1, jiji ≠=  It is clear that a government i subsidy always increases firm i’s 
investment level i, whereas the effect on firm j’s level depends on the sign of the cross effect 
                                                 
5 See Result 2 (iii). That is, the behavior of the firms in the natural Stackelberg equilibrium is 
similar to that in the case of cooperative quality choice.  
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of its profit function. 
   We first consider the unilateral policy at stage 0. That is, noncooperatively, government i 
chooses a subsidy/tax on its domestic firm, i.e., ,is  to maximize domestic social welfare, 
,iW  which is given by 
[ ] [ ] [ ] ],[,][, iijiiiiijiiii qFqqRqFsqqsW −=−Π=  
where [ ] .,2,1,,, jijissqq jiii ≠==  From the FOC to maximize the social welfare of 
country i, i.e., ,0=
∂
∂
i
i
s
W
 given ,js  the optimal quality-upgrading R&D investment policy 
in the noncooperative case is given by .1* 



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
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ii
ij
j
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i
i sq
sq
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F
s   
In view of the effects on the quality levels derived above, this optimal policy is rewritten 
as: 
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In this case, we obtain ( ) .* 







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Rsignssign  Furthermore, because it holds 
that ,
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sign  we derive as follows. 
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where .,2,1, jiji ≠=  Therefore, as already shown in Spencer and Brander (1983), Park 
(2001), Toshimitsu and Jinji (2008), and others, in view of eq. (12), we summarize as follows. 
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Lemma 3 
An optimal quality-upgrading R&D investment policy of the home government, i.e., country i, 
depends on 
(i) the sign of the externality of the foreign firm’s R&D activities toward the home firm, 
i.e., ,
j
i
q
R
∂
∂
 ,,2,1, jiji ≠=  and  
(ii) the sign of the slope of the foreign firm’s R&D investment reaction curves, i.e., ,
i
j
dq
dq
 
in other words, the sign of the cross effect of the foreign firm’s profit function, i.e., 
,
22




∂∂
∂
=
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ij
j
ij
j
qq
R
qq
 ,,2,1, jiji ≠=  
where firm i (j) is the home (foreign) firm.  
 
Lemma 3 (ii) means that the strategic relationship between firms is either substitute or 
complement, i.e., 0<
i
j
dq
dq
 or ,0>
i
j
dq
dq
 .,2,1, jiji ≠=  Taking into account Lemmas 1 
and 3, we present the optimal quality-upgrading R&D investment policy in the 
noncooperative case as follows. 
 
Result 4 
(i) If either θ>Θ>Θ 21  or ,21 Θ>Θ>θ  an optimal R&D investment policy is a 
subsidy, i.e., ,0* >is  .2,1=i  
(ii) If ,21 Θ>>Θ θ  an optimal R&D investment policy is a tax, i.e., ,0* <is  .2,1=i  
 
   Furthermore, based on Result 4, we directly derive as follows. 
 
Corollary 1 
(i) A noncooperative quality-upgrading R&D investment subsidy policy is Pareto 
improving (beggar-thy-neighbor) if θ>Θ>Θ 21  ( ).21 Θ>Θ>θ  
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(ii) A noncooperative quality-upgrading R&D investment tax policy on firm 2 (1) is 
Pareto improving (beggar-thy-neighbor) if .21 Θ>>Θ θ   
 
   As analyzed in Section 4.3, an optimal R&D investment policy in the noncooperative case 
is one in which the government makes the domestic firm the leader in a Stackelberg game. 
This aspect has already been addressed in the context of strategic trade and industrial policies. 
Thus, if the degree of a demand spillover effect of both firms is either larger or smaller than a 
certain value of substitutability of the products, each government gives the domestic firm a 
subsidy to upgrade their quality level. Incidentally, in the case of a large enough demand 
spillover effect, subsidizing the domestic firm increases the foreign firm’s quality level as 
well as that of the domestic firm. This, in turn, leads to an increase in the profits of both firms, 
and thus the welfare of both countries. Thus, the R&D investment subsidy is a Pareto 
improving policy. However, in the case of a smaller demand spillover effect, subsidizing the 
domestic firm reduces the foreign firm’s quality level, but increases that of the domestic firm. 
This, in turn, leads to the profit of the foreign firm falling, and an increase in the profit of the 
domestic firm. In this case, the R&D investment subsidy is a beggar-thy-neighbor policy. 
In the case of asymmetric spillover effects, each government taxes the domestic firm to 
reduce the quality level. That is, a decrease in the quality level of firm 1 (2) reduces 
(increases) the quality level of firm 2 (1). In this case, the profit of firm 1 (2) increases by the 
negative (positive) externality effect on the revenue of firm 1 (2). However, a country’s R&D 
investment tax policy, in which the firm produces the product associated with a larger 
(smaller) demand spillover effect, reduces (increases) the profit of the other firm, and thus the 
welfare of the other country. Therefore, the R&D investment tax policy is a 
beggar-thy-neighbor (Pareto improving) policy. 
   Second, we proceed to analyze the optimal R&D investment policy in the cooperative 
case, in which the government institutes an R&D investment policy to maximize the joint 
social welfare of both countries: 
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ],,,,,, 21221121221121 qqqqssWssWssW Π+Π=+≡  
where [ ],, 21 ssqq ii =  .2,1=i  Hence, the FOC to maximize the joint social welfare with 
respect to the cooperative R&D investment policy of the home government is represented as 
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Similarly, for the cooperative R&D investment policy of the foreign government, we have 
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From the two equations above, an optimal cooperative R&D investment policy is given by 
,1 



∂
∂
′
=
i
j
i
C
i q
R
F
s  ,,2,1, jiji ≠=   
where superscript C denotes the cooperative case. Therefore, we sum up as follows. 
 
Lemma 4 
An optimal cooperative R&D investment policy by the home government depends on the sign 
of the externality of the home firm’s R&D activities toward the foreign firm, i.e., ,
i
j
q
R
∂
∂
 
,,2,1, jiji ≠=  where firm i (j) is the home (foreign) firm. 
 
Based on Lemma 4, we directly derive an optimal policy in the case of cooperation 
between home and foreign governments as follows. 
 
Result 5 
(i) If θ>Θ>Θ 21 ( ),21 Θ>Θ>θ   then a cooperative R&D investment subsidy (tax) is 
optimal, i.e., 0>Cis  ( ),0<Cis  .2,1=i  
(ii) If ,21 Θ>>Θ θ  then a cooperative R&D investment subsidy on firm 1 and tax on firm 
2 are optimal, i.e., 01 >
Cs  and .02 <
Cs  
 
As already addressed in Section 4.2, the analysis of the cooperative R&D investment 
policy is similar to that of a cooperative quality decision game to maximize the joint profits of 
the firms. Because, in the case of a large (small) demand spillover effect, an increase 
(decrease) in the quality level of the two firms increases joint profits, the government 
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subsidizes (taxes) the domestic firm.  
In the model of vertical product differentiation, Zhou et al. (2002, Proposition 3) show 
that jointly optimal policies involve an investment subsidy in the developed country and an 
investment tax in the less developed country. In their model, the firm producing the product 
with a high (low) quality level locates in the developed (less developed) country. That is, the 
jointly optimal policies expand the difference in quality levels, and thus mitigate price 
competition. This, in turn, increases the joint profits of the firms, and thus the joint welfare of 
their countries.  
In our model, under asymmetric demand spillover effects, subsidizing firm 1 producing 
the product with a large demand spillover effect and taxing firm 2 producing the product with 
a small demand spillover effect increases (reduces) the quality level of firm 1 (2). This, in turn, 
locates the combination of these quality levels in the Pareto superior sets. Thus, the joint 
profits of the firms and the joint welfare of the countries increase. However, in this case, these 
increases are due to both an increase in the constructive effect by upgrading the quality level 
of the product with a large demand spillover effect and a decrease in the combative effect by 
downgrading the quality level of the product with a small demand spillover effect. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Assuming a demand spillover effect associated with upgrading the quality level of a 
product, we have analyzed the strategic relationship between firms and the property of an 
SPNE in a price–quality duopolistic competition in a horizontally differentiated products 
market. In particular, upgrading the quality level can increase the rival firm’s demand. Hence, 
we have shown that if the degree of a demand spillover effect is larger (smaller) than a certain 
value of substitutability between the products, a strategic complement (substitute) relationship 
between the firms is obtained. Accordingly, both firms have incentives to increase (decrease) 
their quality level. Furthermore, in the case of asymmetric demand spillover effects between 
firms, the strategic complement and substitute relationships hold. That is, if the rival firm 
produces the product associated with a large (small) demand spillover effect, the firm has an 
incentive to increase (reduce) the quality level. 
   Furthermore, we have analyzed some issues as follows. First, we have compared the 
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quality levels of the SPNE with those of the second-best case. That is, the quality levels in the 
former are lower than those in the latter in spite of the degree of the demand spillover effect. 
Second, we have discussed the case of a cooperative quality choice. That is, comparing the 
noncooperative case with the cooperative one, we have found that if a demand spillover effect 
is larger (smaller) than a certain value of substitutability of the products, the cooperative 
quality level is higher (lower) than the noncooperative quality level. Furthermore, if the firm 
produces the product associated with a large (small) demand spillover effect, the cooperative 
quality level is higher (lower) than the noncooperative quality level. Third, we have illustrated 
that there is a natural Stackelberg equilibrium under asymmetric demand spillover effects. 
That is, the firm producing the product associated with a large (small) demand spillover effect 
is a follower (leader). In addition, a natural Stackelberg equilibrium is Pareto superior to the 
other equilibria. Finally, we have addressed an optimal R&D investment policy in the 
noncooperative and cooperative cases. If the degree of a demand spillover effect is either 
sufficiently large or small, then an optimal R&D investment policy is a subsidy in the 
noncooperative case. However, under asymmetric demand spillover effects, an optimal R&D 
investment policy is a tax. In the case of a cooperative R&D investment policy, a subsidy 
(tax) is optimal, with a large (small) demand spillover effect. Also, under an asymmetric 
demand spillover effect, a cooperative optimal policy is a subsidy (tax) on the firm producing 
the product with a large (small) demand spillover effect. This result is similar to that in the 
cooperative quality decision game to maximize the joint profit. 
   We have assumed the external effect of upgrading quality on the demand side. Although 
we usually understand the combative effect of quality improvement on a rival firm, we rarely 
consider the constructive effect. However, we may examine the demand side effects of 
advertising investment as an example. That is, a persuasive and/or informative advertising 
investment of one firm may increase demand from the rival firm’s customers as well as its 
own customers because the market’s size expands due to new consumers entering the market. 
Furthermore, as discussed in Foros et al. (2002), as examples to justify a demand spillover 
effect in our model, we take information and communication technology industries such as 
mobile telecommunications, computer hardware and software, cloud computing systems, and 
broadcasting. 
   We have simplified the model to make the analysis tractable; for example, a quasi-linear 
demand function and the linearity of the demand spillover effect function. Were we to assume 
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more general functions, we would have to reconsider the model.  
 
 
Appendix A: the Cournot duopoly case 
From the optimal behavior of a representative consumer, we obtain the inverse demand 
function as follows6. 
.,2,1,,)( jijixxqqp jijjiiii ≠=−−+++= θεβεα               (A.1) 
In this case, in stage 2, Cournot–Nash equilibrium is given by 
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where superscript C denotes the Cournot competition. Also, ,0)2( >−≡Α θαC  
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In stage 1, the profit function is expressed as  
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Furthermore, the cross effect is given by 
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With respect to the effect on profit (revenue), we obtain 
.0)(0)(2 <≥Γ⇔<≥
Δ
Γ
=
∂
Π∂ C
j
C
j
i
j
C
i x
q
                          (A.5) 
                                                 
6 If we assume ,, ββεε == ii ,1=+ βε  and ,1=θ  then we can derive the inverse 
demand function of Foros, et al. (2002). 
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   Therefore, taking eq. (A.3), eq. (A.4), and eq. (A.5) into account, we can derive the same 
results as Lemma 1. In other words, regardless of the mode of competition, the strategic 
relationships of quality decisions between the firms depend on the degree of demand spillover 
effects. 
 
Appendix B: subgame perfect Nash equilibrium 
Let us assume the cost function as follows: .0,2,1,
2
][ 2 >== fiqfqF iii  In this case, 
taking eq. (5) into account, the FOC shown by eq. (7) is rewritten as 
( ) ,,2,1,,0 jijifqqq ijjiii ≠==−Γ+Φ+ΑΧ                     (B.1) 
where .02 2 >Δ
ΦΛ≡Χ ii  Thus, the SOC is given by .2,1, =ΦΧ> if ii   
Accordingly, we derive the reaction function of firm i as follows. 
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Therefore, if the determinant of the equation system given by eq. (B.1) is positive, i.e.,  
,0))(( 12212211 >ΓΧΓΧ−ΦΧ−ΦΧ−≡ ffD  
then there exists an SPNE in a price–quality competition game as follows. 
( ){ },* iijii fDq Γ−ΦΧ−ΑΧ=                                    (B.3) 
where we assume ( ),iijf Γ−ΦΧ>  .,2,1, jiji ≠=  
 
Appendix C: second-best qualities 
Because it holds that [ ] ,2,1,2,1 =Λ= iqqpx ii the consumer surplus is rewritten as 
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 ++Λ= ppppqqCS θ  In this case, the effect of an increase in the 
quality level of product i on consumer surplus is generally expressed by 
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The first term of eq. (C.1) is given by .02)2( >
ΛΔ
++
=
∂
∂
+
∂
∂ ii
i
j
i
i
q
p
q
p βθεθ  The 
second is given by .0)2( >
ΛΔ
++
=
∂
∂
+
∂
∂ θβθεθ ii
i
i
i
j
q
p
q
p
 Thus, it holds that 
.2,1,0 =>
∂
∂ i
q
CS
i
 
Furthermore, with respect to the effect on producer surplus, in view of eq. (10), we have 
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With regard to the second term of eq. (C.2), i.e., the double underline, we obtain 
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Because the first term mentioned above is positive, it holds that .2,1,0
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Figure 2 21 Θ>Θ>θ  
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Figure 3 21 Θ>>Θ θ  
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